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I 0 1990
Sec. 5-2-14(3), St. George City Code

COURT

?EALS

For a licensee or any employee or agent of a licensee to
sell, furnish, dispose of, give, or cause to be sold,
furnished, disposed of or given to a person under the
age of twenty-one (21) years, or for a person under the
age of twenty-one (21) years to buy, receive, have in
possession or consume, beer or any alcoholic beverage.
Sec. 32A-12-13, St. George City Code as adopted

Sec.

1.

It is unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years
to purchase, possess, or consume any alcoholic beverage
or product, unless specifically authorized by this
title.

2.

It is also unlawful for any person under the age of 21
years to misrepresent their age, or for any other
person to misrepresent the age of a minor, for the
purpose of purchasing or otherwise obtaining an
alcoholic beverage or product for a minor.

41-2-133, St. George City Code as adopted
It is a Class B misdemeanor for a person to:
1.

display or cause or permit to be displayed or to have
in possession any license knowing it is fictitious or
has been cancelled, revoked, suspended or altered;

2.

lend or knowingly permit the use of a license issued
to him, by a person not entitled to it;

3.

display or represent as his own a license not issued
to him;

4.

fail or refuse to surrender to the division upon demand
any license which has been suspended, canceled, or
revoked;

5.

use a false name or give a false address in any
application for a license or any renewal or duplicate
of the license, or to knowingly make a false statement,
or to knowingly conceal a material fact or otherwise
commit a fraud in the application; or

6.

permit any other prohibited use of a license issued
to him.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 900143-CA

JASEN RALPH OLSEN,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Response to an Appeal from Final Judgment
and Conviction of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Washington County, St. George Department
and Denial of a New Trial

CONNIE L. MOWER #2339
623 East 100 South
P. 0. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Tel. (801) 363-9345

THEODORE W. SHUMWAY #2953
GARY G. KUHLMANN #4994
City of St. George
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
Tel. (801) 634-5800

Attorney for Appellant
Attorneys for Respondent
1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Table of Contents

i

Table of Authorities

ii

Statement of Jurisdiction

2

Preliminary Statement

2

Issues Presented for Review

2

Statement of the Case

4

Summary of Arguments

6

Argument
A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

The Defendant's Actions with Respect to
Filing His Motion for New Trial, His
Notice of Appeal and His Motion for
Reconsideration, Bring This Court's
Jurisdiction Into Question

7

The Trial Court Properly Denied the
Defendant's Motion to Continue the Trial
Made at the Commencement of Trial

11

The Trial Court Properly Denied the
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial Based
Upon the Circumstances of the Case

14

The Evidence Produced at Trial Was
Sufficient to Establish the Guilt of the
Defendant on the Charges Against Him

17

The Doctrine of Double Jeopardy Does Not
Bar A Conviction of the Defendant for Both
Misrepresentation of Age and Possession or
Consumption of Alcohol by a Minor

20

Conclusion

22

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Association,
24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 (1970)

9

Collins v. Union Federal Savings and Loan Association,
624 P.2d 496 (Nev. 1981)

8

Hunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc.,
15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798, 800 (1964)

8

Jiminez v. Jiminez, 55 Or.App. 221, 637 P.2d 928 (1981)

8

Lee v. Lee. 133 Ariz. 118, 649 P.2d 997
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)

8

Mabrev v. Mobil Oil Corp., 84 N.M. 272, 502 P.2d 297 (1972).

8

State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P.2d 1052, 1056, (1935)

15

State v. Bercrwerff, 777 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)..

18

State v. Campbell, 500 P.2d 801, 805 (Mont. 1972)

19

State v. Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 1985)

9

State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982)

12

State v. Gabaldon, 735 p.2d 410, 412 (Utah

18

Ct. App. 1987)..

State v. Glennv, 656 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1982)

15

State v. Gorlick, 605 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1979)

17

State v. McMullen, 764 P.2d 634 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988)

10

State v. Moosman, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 1990)

17

State v. Ossana. 739 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah 1987)

18

State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

9

State v. Phillips. 102 Ariz. 377, 430 P.2d 139, 142 (1967)..

19

State v. Reed. 190 Kan. 376, 375 P.2d 588 (1962)

8

State v. Ross. 655 P.2d 641, 642 [Utah 1982)

15

State v.

9

Smith. 776 P.2d 929 (Uteih Ct. App. 1989)
ii

State v. Sparks, 672 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1983)

18

State V. Steqqell. 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983)

9

State v. Udell. 728 P.2d 131, 132 (Utah 1986)

18

State v. Waastaff. 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)...

15

State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985)

14

Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 P.2d 425,
426, f.n.2

(Utah 1986)

10

Welch v. State, 390 P.2d 35 (Nev. 1964)

8

Wendling v. Southwest Savings and Loan Association,
143 Ariz. 599, 694 P.2d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)

8

Statutes
Sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (d) , Utah Code Annotated

iii

2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-2a-3(2) (d) , the Utah
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from the Circuit
Court.

However, there is a question as to that jurisdiction with

respect to certain issues raised in this appeal due to proceedings
by the Defendant

in the Circuit Court with respect to, and

following the filing of, his notice of appeal.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Defendant was charged with possession or consumption of
alcoholic beverages by a minor, misrepresentation of age by a minor
for the purpose of purchasing alcoholic beverages, and possession
of a fictitious identification, all in violation of the St. George
City Code.

The Defendant pled not guilty to such charges and was

tried in absentia before the Fifth Circuit Court of Utah, St.
George Department, on February 5, 1990.

The Defendant was found

guilty of the three offenses charged and was ordered to pay fines
in the total sum of $455.00.

The Defendant filed a Notice of

Appeal on or about March 6, 1990.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider issues

raised by the Defendant's Motion for New Trial based upon the
2

failure of the Notice of Appeal to specify an appeal from the
denial of such motion.
2.

Whether the Defendant's Notice of Appeal allows this Court

to consider the trial court's denial of the Motion for new Trial,
or whether this Court is precluded from considering matters raised
by the Defendant's Motion for New Trial.
3.

Whether this Court has jurisdiction over any issues raised

by the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of his
Motion for New Trial when it was filed after his Notice of Appeal.
4.

Whether the trial court properly denied the Defendant's

motion to continue the trial and properly proceeded with a trial
in absentia where the Defendant knew of the trial date, knew of the
charges against him, and had communicated to the prosecutor the
Defendant's intentional and voluntary waiver of his appearance and
plea of guilty to Count I of the Information.
5.

Whether the trial court properly denied the Defendant's

Motion for New Trial based upon the Defendant's knowledge of the
charges against him, opportunity to appear at trial, and failure
to appear at trial.
6.
court's

Whether the evidence presented at trial supports the trial
finding

that the Defendant was guilty

against him as contained in the Information.

3

of

the

charges

7.

Whether the Defendant can properly be convicted of

misrepresentation of age for the purpose of purchasing alcoholic
beverages

as well

as unlawful

possession

or

consumption

of

alcoholic beverages, both in violation of the St. George City Code.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Although the Statement of the Case and Statement of the Facts
presented by the Defendant is slanted in his favor, the City
accepts such Statement of the Case and Statement of the Facts with
the following facts added.
1. At the time that the Defendant was issued the citation on
November 24, 1989, the Defendant signed the citation and received
a copy thereof.

The citation clearly sets forth three charges

against the Defendant.
2.

(R. 1) .

On or about December 15, 1989, the Defendant filed a

Request for Discovery with the City.

(R. 5,6)

The City responded

to the discovery request on December 21, 1989, and as part of such
response, provided the Defendant with a copy of the police report
which

clearly

offenses.

shows that the Defendant was cited

for three

(R. 8, Response to Request No. 5).

3. The City prosecutor first talked with Defendant's attorney
on the morning of February 5, 1990, the day of the trial. (Tr. p. 3
1.6-8; R. 28)

Defendant's counsel had previously left messages
4

with the City prosecutor!s office, failing, however, to indicate
the reason for the call or what she was calling about. During the
conversation on February 5, 1990, the City prosecutor indicated
that he did not have the Defendant's file in front of him and that
he was not familiar with the case. (Tr. p.3 1.8-10; R. 28)

The

Defendant's counsel discussed the matter with the City prosecutor
and after the prosecutor refused to dismiss or modify the charge
of minor in possession or consuming, an agreement was reached that
the Defendant would plead guilty to that charge. (Tr. p. 3 1.1320; R. 28, 29)

At the time of this discussion the City prosecutor

was not aware that the Defendant had been charged with three
separate offenses.
4.

(Tr. p.3 1.23-24; R. 31)

At the time of the conversation on February 5, 1990,

Defendant's counsel was also not aware that the Defendant had three
charges against him.

(Defendant's Response to Motion for Summary

Disposition at page 3.)

No discussion of the charges other than

minor in possession or consuming occurred during the February 5,
1990 conversation.
5.

(Tr. p.3 1.8-24)

On February 15, 1990, the Defendant filed a Motion for

New Trial based solely upon the Defendant's claim that he did not
knowingly or intentionally waive his right to appear for trial. (R.
17)

The motion was denied on February 20, 1990. (R. 25)

On March

8, 1990, the Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal.

(R. 32)

5

Subsequent to filing of the Notice of Appeal, the Defendant on
March 29, 1990, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with respect to
the Motion for New Trial.

(R. 41)

was denied on April 9, 1990.

The Motion for Reconsideration

(R. 52, 53)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant has failed to properly perfect issues for appeal
to this Court.

The Defendant's Notice of Appeal is limited to the

judgment entered against the Defendant on February 5, 1990,

Thus,

issues raised with respect to the denial of the Motion for New
Trial are not before the Court.

As the Defendant filed his Notice

of Appeal prior to filing his Motion for Reconsideration of the
Motion

for

New

Trial,

any

issues

raised

by

the

Reconsideration are likewise not before this Court.

Motion

for

Finally, as

the Defendant failed to raise questions as to the sufficiency of
evidence, double jeopardy and denial of a continuance with the
trial court at the time of filing the Motion for New Trial, and did
not raise such issues at trial, such issues are not preserved for
consideration herein.
Should the Court find that there are issues regarding the
trial court's judgment, such judgment should be sustained as the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to continue
the trial or in proceeding with the trial in absentia where the

6

Defendant

knew

of the trial date and his need

voluntarily failed to do so.

to

appear

and

Likewise, should the Court find that

issues raised by the Defendants Motion for New Trial are properly
before this Court, the Court should find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the Defendant a new trial based
upon the Defendant's knowledge and actions in failing to appear at
trial.
Finally, based upon the plain reading of the statutes under
which the Defendant was charged, this Court should sustain the
trial

court's

finding

that

the

Defendant

is

guilty

of

both

possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages by a minor and use
of false identification for the purpose of purchasing alcoholic
beverages.

The elements necessary to prove these offenses are

distinct and one is not a lesser included offense of the other.

ARGUMENT
A.

The Defendant's Actions with Respect to Filing His
Motion for New Trial, His Notice of Appeal and His
Motion for Reconsideration, Bring This Court's
Jurisdiction Into Question.

A question regarding this Court's jurisdiction and scope of
review is raised by the Defendant's Notice of Appeal.

Rule 3(d)

of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of
appeal designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed
7

from.

The purpose of a notice of appeal is to advise the opposing

party that an appeal has been taken from a specific judgment or
order in the case. Additionally, a "Respondent is entitled to know
specifically which judgment is being appealed."
Katz

Real

Estate,

Inc.,

15

Utah

2d

126,

388

Hunley v. Stan
P.2d

798,800

(1964)(Appeal dismissed where notice of appeal designated wrong
judgment) .

The rule that an appeal is limited to the matter

designated in the notice of appeal has been widely followed.

See

Wendling v. Southwest Savings and Loan Association, 143 Ariz. 599,
694 P.2d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984),

Lee v. Lee, 133 Ariz. 118,

649 P.2d 997 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982), Jiminez v. Jiminez, 55 Or. App.
221, 637 P.2d 928 (1981), Collins v. Union Federal Savings and Loan
Association, 624 P.2d 496 (Nev. 1981), Mabrey v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
84 N.M. 272, 502 P.2d 297 (1972), Welch v. State, 390 P.2d 35 (Nev.
1964), and State v. Reed, 190 Kan. 376, 375 P.2d 588 (1962).
In this case, the Defendant's Notice of Appeal indicates only
that the appeal is from "that judgment and conviction rendered
against

[Defendant] on the 5th day of February, 1990."

Thus,

Defendant is limited herein to presenting issues relating to the
judgment of the trial court and is precluded from raising issues
regarding the denial of the Motion for New Trial.
Should the Court determine that the Defendant may properly
question the trial court's denial of the Motion for New Trial, a
8

review of such issues should be limited.

On February 15, 1990, the

Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial with the trial court,

the

only issue raised as a basis for seeking a new trial was the
Defendant's failure to appear at trial.

The Defendant claimed the

right to a new trial based upon his claim that he did not knowingly
or intentionally waive his right to a be present at trial.

The

trial court, finding that the Defendant was aware of the three
charges against him, and noting that plea bargains are not legally
effective unless approved by the court, denied the motion.
It is well established that in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, an appellate court will not review matters raised
for the first time on appeal where no timely and proper objection
was made in the trial court.
(Utah 1983) .

State v. Steqqell, 660 P. 2d 252, 254

See also State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26, 29 (Utah Ct.

App. 1989), State v.

Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 1985),

and, especially, State v. Smith, 776 P. 2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
wherein it was also noted that this Court would not review issues
for the first time on appeal which had not been raised in the trial
court through a motion to arrest judgment.

Id. at 931, f.n.l.

Finally, in Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Association, 24 Utah 2d
292, 470 P.2d 393 (1970), the court stated "No motion for a new
trial was made by plaintiff, and so the trial court was not given
the opportunity to correct the verdict rendered by the jury.
9

An

appellate court ought not to do that which was not requested of the
trial court."

Id. at 396.

In this case, the only issue raised by the Defendant through
his Motion for New Trial dealt with whether he had knowingly and
intentionally waived his right to be present at trial. Based upon
such limited request and the above case law, if the denial of the
Motion for New Trial is to be reviewed at all, this Court should
limit its review to no more than the issue of the Defendant's
failure to appear at trial and should not address the sufficiency
of the evidence and other issues raised by Defendant in his brief.
As a final matter of jurisdiction, it should be noted that
the Defendant, after filing his Notice of Appeal filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Motion for New Trial.

The trial court

denied the motion noting that there was no provision for rehearing
on the Motion for New Trial and that the Motion for Reconsideration
was not timely as a motion for new trial.

It has been held that

an untimely Motion for Reconsideration has no effect upon the
finality of the judgment rendered by the trial court or the running
of time for an appeal.

Transamerica Cash Reserve Inc. v. Hafen,

723 P.2d 425, 426 f.n.2 (Utah 1986).

Additionally, it has been

held that a trial court is without power to alter its prior ruling
upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration which is, in
essence, the same motion for new trial.
10

State v. McMullen, 764

P.2d 634 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988),

Thus, should this Court determine

that it has jurisdiction over this appeal despite the problems set
out above, any matters considered by the trial court or raised by
the Defendant with respect to the Motion for Reconsideration are
not properly within the Court's jurisdiction on this appeal.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Denied the Defendant's Motion
to Continue the Trial Made at the Commencement of Trial.

After the Court had scheduled four arraignment dates for the
Defendant between November 27, 1989 and December 15, 1989, the
Defendant's counsel entered a plea of not guilty on December 18,
1989.

On January 11, 1990, a notice setting trial for February 5,

1990 was sent to the parties. On the morning of trial Defendant's
counsel contacted the City prosecutor to discuss the case. At such
time, it appears that neither the City prosecutor nor Defendant's
counsel were aware that three charges were pending against the
Defendant.

During their conversation the Defendant's counsel

agreed to transmit to the City prosecutor a signed waiver and entry
of plea

of guilty to the charge of minor

consuming.

in possession or

Later that afternoon, and prior to trial, the City

informed the office of Defendant's counsel of the other pending
charges.

The secretary to Defendant's counsel requested that the

City seek a continuance of the trial. At the commencment of trial,
the Defendant's request for continuance was communicated to the
court.

The court, after reviewing the file and the Defendant's
11

failure

to

continuance.

appear

at

the

prior

arraignments,

denied

the

The Defendant now argues that the court's failure to

grant the continuance was erroneous since the Defendant did not
voluntarily absent himself from the trial.
It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere,
that the granting of continuances is at the
discretion of the trial judge, whose decision
will not be reversed by this court absent a
clear abuse of that discretion. State v.
Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d 1093 (1975). Abuse
may be found where a party has made timely
objections, given necessary notice and made
a reasonable effort to have the trial date
reset for good cause. Griffiths v. Hammon,
Utah, 560 P.2d 1375 (1977).
State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982).
The facts presented to the trial court at the time of the
request for continuance certainly justified the court's exercise
of discretion in denying the continuance. The record revealed that
the Defendant had failed to appear, for various personal reasons,
at several arraignments.
trial, had received

The Defendant had received notice of the

a copy of the citation setting

forth the

charges against him, during the discovery process had received a
copy of the police report setting forth the three charges against
him, and an information has been filed against him setting forth
the three charges.

No contact was made by the Defendant with the

City prosecutor until shortly before trial. It is obvious that the
Defendant did not intend to appear at the time of trial since
12

telephone contact was made on the morning of trial from an attorney
in Salt Lake and the trial was being held in St. George.
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
a defendant has a right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel in all cases.

The Defendant is to be personally present

at

that

the

trial

except

in prosecutions

for

offenses

not

punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the
trial after notice to the defendant of the time for trial will not
prevent the case from being tried, and a verdict or judgment
entered therein has the same effect as if defendant had been
present.
Despite the Defendant's claims, it is clearly evident that the
Defendant here received notice of the date and time for trial. The
Defendant's failure to appear was based simply upon the fact that
he had entered what he thought to be a plea arrangement with the
City.

However, the Defendant knew that more than one charge was

involved, and he should not be allowed to rely upon his failure to
deal with all three charges as grounds for claiming his nonappearance was not voluntary.

This is not a case where the

Defendant's counsel advised him that the trial would not go forward
or did not advise him of the trial date.

Rather, the burden was

placed on the Defendant, the person knowing the charges against
him, to be present at trial or otherwise deal with the charges.
13

The Defendant's reliance on the discussed plea arrangement as a
basis for not attending the trial should not be found to justify
his non-appearance.

Plea bargains between the parties are not

binding until approved by the court.
Criminal Procedure.

Rule 11, Utah Rules of

Thus, the arrangement between counsel was

simply a proposal to be made to the court and, obviously, if the
court had denied the plea bargain, the trial would be held as
scheduled.

Despite this, the Defendant and his counsel took upon

themselves the risk of non-appearance and should now be held to
such actions.
C.

The Trial Court Properly Denied the Defendant's Motion
for A New Trial Based Upon the Circumstances of the Case.

Should this Court find it proper to review the trial court's
denial of the Defendant's Motion for New Trial, such denial should
be upheld.

The decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter

of discretion with the trial court and such decision will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.
712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985).

State v. Williams,

In the case at hand, the Defendant

filed his motion for new trial based solely upon the grounds that
he did not knowingly or intentionally waive his right to appear for
trial.

In support of the motion for new trial the Defendant's

counsel submitted an affidvait setting forth her involvement in
this case and the conversations which she had with the City
prosecutor.

The affidavit states that on or about December 15,
14

1989

the

Defendant

advised

her

that

he

was

scheduled

for

arraignment on his criminal charges that day. Defendant's counsel
then filed a written plea of not guilty to the charges.

Thus, it

appears that the Defendant clearly knew that there was more than
one criminal charge pending against him.

The affidavit further

sets forth that the Defendant's attorney received notice of the
February 5, 1990 trial some time subsequent to December 15, 1989.
Yet, as has been set forth herein, the City prosecutor's first
conversation with the Defendant's counsel was on the day of trial.
The right of a criminal defendant to appear and defend in
person at all stages of trial may be waived by the defendant's
voluntary absence from trial.

State v.

Glenny, 656 P. 2d 990,991

(Utah 1982) . Voluntariness is determined by considering a totality
of the circumstances.

State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah

Ct. App. 1989) . In cases where it is argued that the defendant was
not voluntarily absent from trial, "it is generally held that the
defendant cannot by his voluntary act invalidate the proceedings."
State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641, 642 (Utah 1982).

In Wagstaff, supra,

this Court, citing State v. Aikers. 87 Utah 507, 51 P. 2d 1052, 1056
(1935), noted:
It is not only the right of the defendant to
be present, but is a duty which the statute
imposes upon him, and he usually will not be
permitted to take advantage of his own
misconduct when he has voluntarily absented
himself from the trial. It is one thing
15

for him to absent himself when he is at
liberty and can voluntarily do so, and
quite another thing for the court to
deprive him of any substantial right
against his protest . . .
A defendant is entitled to be safeguarded
in every constitutional right, but should
not be permitted to so juggle with such
rights as to embarrass and delay the
courts or to defeat the ends of justice.
Waastaff, 772 P.2d at 990.
Nothing in the Motion for New Trial indicates any agreement
between the parties with respect to the three charges pending
against the Defendant. The Defendant does not assert that the City
in any way agreed to dismiss two of the charges based upon the
Defendant's plea of guilty to possession of alcohol by a minor.
Thus, had the Defendant wished to contest the other charges he was
required to appear at trial. However, the Defendant made no effort
to

appear

at

trial

and,

indeed, with

respect

to

Count

I,

voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally waived his right to appear
at such trial.

Nothing

in the Motion for New Trial cited

deficiencies in the evidence or other causes for the granting of
a new trial. The trial court reviewed the evidence and denied the
Motion for New Trial since the Defendant was aware from the
citation that three charges were pending and since plea bargains
are not legally effective until approved by the court. Such a find
was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances.
16

D.

The Evidence Produced At Trial Was Sufficient to
Establish the Guilt of the Defendant on the Charges
Against Him.

Should the Court find that the Defendant has properly reserved
for appeal the question of the sufficiency of evidence at trial,
this Court should find that the evidence is sufficient to uphold
the trial court's judgment. "When challenging the findings of fact
of the trial court on appeal, the appellant must show that the
findings of fact were clearly erroneous.

In order to show clear

error, the appellant must marshall all of the evidence in support
of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support against an attack."
Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 1990).

State v. Moosman, 135

In reviewing the trial courts

judgment, "the function of this court 'is not to determine guilt
or

innocence, the

weight

to

give

conflicting

evidence, the

credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given defendants
testimony."1

State v. Gorlick, 605 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1979),

Rather, where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, this
court will:
Review the evidence and all inferences which
may be reasonably drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict. State v.
Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). "When
there is any evidence including reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from it, from
which findings of all the requisite elements
17

of the crime can be reasonably made, [the
Court] inquiry stops, and [the Court]
sustain[s] the verdict." State v. Gehring,
694 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 1984).
State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 132 (Utah 1986).

The Court will not

substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, State v.
Sparks, 672 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah 1987), and the verdict
will not be overturned unless there is a clear showing of lack of
evidence or that the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds could not reasonably believe the
defendant had committed a crime.
412 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410,

See also State v. Berowerff. 777 P. 2d

510, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The Defendant herein claims that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to (1) prove that the crimes occurred in St. George
and (2) prove the Defendant's culpability for possession of a false
identification.
The City does not dispute that as part of its case, it must
prove that the Defendant possessed or consumed alcoholic beverages,
and used a false identification to purchase alcoholic beverages,
within the boundaries of the City.
trial.

Indeed, such was proven at

In reviewing the facts and inferences presented to the

trial court in the light most favorable to the findings of that
court, it is evident that the findings were not clearly erroneous.
18

At trial, the officer testifying on behalf of the City stated that
he observed the Defendant in the parking lot of a 7-11 located at
Dixie Downs Road and Sunset. The Defendant was running across the
parking lot carrying a sack and cans of beer were spilling out of
the sack onto the parking lot. The Defendant jumped into a vehicle
which then pulled out onto Sunset in an eastbound direction.

The

officer immediately made a traffic stop at that location. (Tr. p.5
1.13-15, 21-p.6 1.16)•
The intersection of Dixie Downs Road and Sunset lies within
the boundaries of the City of St. George.

A vehicle traveling

eastbound on Sunset is traveling toward the City Center.

This

would be clearly evident to the judge hearing the case since he has
been a resident of this area for many years.

The judge certainly

could appropriately take judicial notice of the locations testified
to as being within the boundaries of the City of St. George.

See

Rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence, State v. Campbell, 500 P. 2d 801,
805 (Mont. 1972), State v. Phillips, 102 Ariz. 377, 430 P.2d 139,
142 (1967) .

It is also clearly evident from the facts presented

that the Defendant was in possession of alcohol at the location
where the officer observed and stopped him.
The testimony establishes that the Defendant was a minor. (Tr.
p.7 1. 19-22).

As the Defendant stepped out of the vehicle, he

tossed an identification card with his picture on it onto the
19

ground

under

the

truck.

(Tr.

p.6

1.21-p.7

1.1).

The

identification card had a date of birth on it indicating that he
was over 21 years of age.

(Tr. p. 7 1. 1-4).

The Defendant

admitted to the officers that he had used the identification card
to purchase beer (Tr. p. 8 1.6-9) at a location up the road (Tr.
p. 11, 1.1-5, 10-13). The evidence further presented indicated that
the Defendant had been drinking or was intoxicated (Tr. p. 8, 1.
13-15;

p. 10, 1. 5-13).

Based upon the evidence presented to the court and properly
taking notice as to the locations discussed, the court determined
"it appears abundantly clear from the evidence that the Defendant
is guilty of all three charges and I find him guilty of all three
counts."

(Tr. p.12, 1. 5-7). The evidence and inferences viewed

in the light most favorable to the verdict clearly establish that
the evidence was sufficient to find the Defendant guilty of the
charges against him.
E.

The Doctrine of Double Jeopardy Does Not Bar A
Conviction of the Defendant for Both Misrepresentation
of Age and Possession or Consumption of Alcohol by a
Minor.

The Defendant argues that the doctrine of double jeopardy
prohibits the Defendant in this case from being convicted of both
possession

or

consumption

of

alcohol

by

a

minor

and

misrepresentation of age for the purpose of purchasing alcohol by
a minor. The Defendant argues that the ordinances under which the
20

Defendant was charged makes a minor in possession or consumption
of alcohol a lesser included offense of misrepresentation of age
by a minor for the purpose of purchasing alcohol. Should the Court
determine that this issue was properly reserved for appeal by the
Defendant, the Court should find that the conviction
Defendant on both counts was proper.

of the

A review of the ordinance,

and the state statute from which it is derived, reveals that no
jeopardy bar exists.

A reading of the ordinance establishes that

the two acts are distinct and constitue grounds for separate
convictions. Sec. 32A-12-13 of the St. George City Code as adopted
states that it is unlawful for a minor to possess or consume
alcoholic beverages.

The Ordinance then states "(2) it is also

unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to misrepresent
their age for the purpose of purchasing . . . an alcoholic beverage
or product".

(emphasis added) The plain and common meaning of the

word "also" as used in the ordinance is "besides; in addition to;
too."

Websters Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1989.

Thus, the

ordinance provides that in addition to it being unlawful for a
minor to possess or consume alcoholic beverages, it is also
unlawful for a minor to misrepresent his age for the purpose of
purchasing alcoholic beverages.
Obviously a minor may possess or consume alcoholic beverages
without using a false identification to purchase them.
21

Equally,

a minor may present a false identification for the purpose of
purchasing alcoholic beverages without ever being in possession of
or consuming alcoholic beverages.
proved

in

provisions.

order

to

convict

Different elements must be

a defendant

under

the

separate

Nothing in the ordinance or the fact that the

ordinances operate in conjunction with each other, would evidence
that one of the sections is a lesser included offense of the other.
Since

the

ordinance

supports

separate

offenses

and

separate

convictions, the Defendant was properly convicted of both offenses
and can be fined with respect to each.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant's limited Notice of Appeal, limited Motion for
New Trial and actions in the trial court subsequent to the filing
of the Notice of Appeal defeat this Court's jurisdiction over this
appeal.

However, should this Court find jurisdiction over the

original appeal, it is evident from the facts presented and the
arguments made herein that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in denying

the Defendant's motion to continue the trial

and properly proceeded with the trial in absentia based upon the
Defendant's knowledge of the charges against him, knowledge of the
trial date, and voluntary absence from the trial. No one precluded
the Defendant from appearing at the time of trial and the decision
22

not to appear was wholly that of the Defendant based upon knowledge
of the circumstances of the case.
It is further evident as set forth above, that the trial court
properly denied the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial again based
upon the Defendant's knowledge and opportunity to appear at trial
and his failure to do so.

The evidence presented to trial court

in a light favorable to the judgment show that there was sufficient
evidence, together with the inferences drawn therefrom, to find the
Defendant guilty of the charges against him. Nothing in the record
or the arguments of the Defendant would show that the court's
judgment was clearly erroneous.

Finally, the Defendant

was

properly convicted of the separate offenses of possession or
consumption of an alcoholic beverage and misrepresentation of age
in order to purchase an alcoholic beverage, based upon the facts
presented and the admissions of the Defendant. Therefore, the City
respectfully requests that this Court uphold the conviction of the
Defendant as found by the trial court,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

H~~

day of September, 1990.

Attorneys for Appellee
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